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THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF GESTATION 
Lany I. Palmer 
Editor's note: This article is from a talk given at the Pew 
Science Symposium on Ethics and Science at Union 
College, Schenectady, New York, on May l9, 1992. 
The views expressed here are those of the aut~ and do 
not necessarily reflect the position of the New Y ark State 
Bar Association's Special Committee on Biotechnology 
and the Law, which the author chaired. 
The use of reproductive technologies has I captured 
the public's imagination since the celebrated Baby 
M surrogate-parenting case in 1987. The saga of 
Marybeth Whitehead-Gould, William and Eliza-
beth Stem, and Baby M, the child that %itehead-
Gould agreed to bear for the Stems, has lbeen the 
subject of numerous newspaper articles, books, and 
television talk shows. It even provided sufficient 
drama for a made-for-television movie. 
The use of reproductive technologies *ises new 
questions about a woman's authority and control 
over her fetus and child; and so the dialogue about 
the appropriate use of those technologies must take 
place within the wider context of. the ethiqal, politi-
cal, and legal debate about abortton. 1 
At the center of that debate is the! series of 
Supreme Court opinions, beginning with Roe v. 
Wade in 1973, that have defined our abortion laws. 
Those "rights-based" legal decisions have !created a 
rhetoric of discussions not only about abdrtion but 
also about many other aspects of reproduction. 
When thinking about issues related· to surro-
gate parenting, in vitro fertilization, tihe cryo-
preservation (freezing) ofhuman embryos, $nd many 
other issues, we therefore tend to adopt th~ "rights" 
formulation of the abortion debate. We are confused 
about whether a woman's right to control her body 
includes her right to contract in advance to give 
away a child she will bear. We question wnat right a 
man who allows a surrogate to use his sperm for 
artificial insemination has to legally compel that 
woman to give him (and his wife) the child to raise 
as their own child. We ask even more disturbing 
questions about what rights either a husband or a 
wife has to embryos created from their gametes 
during the process of in vitro fertilization if that 
couple divorces before the embryos are implanted. 
Our focus on rights-the rights of women, the 
rights of men, the rights of embryos, the rights of 
fetuses, the right to privacy, and the right to life-
distracts us from considering the social implications 
of the new technologies. And framing ethical ques-
tions in terms of rights also masks a deeper debate 
about the institution of the family and the obliga-
tions that adults have toward children. The use of 
reproductive technologies challenges some of our 
most fundamental assumptions about the creation 
and nurturing of human life. 
I want to offer a different perspective for think-
ing about those technologies and their relation to 
the modem family by considering the law's relation 
to the dynamics of societal institutions. Our culture 
has both public institutions, including medicine, 
education, marriage, and law, and private institu-
tions, including family and religion. Law serves two 
distinct functions in relation to each type of institu-
tion. In general, it functions to regulate public 
institutions while it serves to protect private institu-
tions. For example, law regulates marriage, which is 
essentially a public act. Because our society recog-
nizes marriage as a desirable goal, we regulate it 
minimally. 
Private institutions such as the family and reli-
gion are protected, rather than regulated, by law. We 
believe that children are best raised and socialized 
inside a family. Laws are tailored to support the 
family unit, primarily by not restricting parental 
freedom to decide how to care for and nurture chil-
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dren. The law protects the family from state interfer-
ence in childbearing and child-rearing decisions. Of 
course, there are limits to that protection. For ex-
ample, we have numerous regulations about marital 
dissolution, because of other concerns about the 
family, including the general welfare of children and 
the economic welfare of the spouses. 
To illustrate my institutionalist approach, I want 
to discuss the evolution of my ideas about the appro-
priate legal responses to the use of assisted-reproduc-
tion technologies. First, I will briefly discuss the use 
of artificial insemination. Second, I will look at the 
practice of in vitro fertilization. And finally, I will 
focus on the problem of "gestational surrogacy," 
which judges, lawyers, and, most importantly, legis-
latures, are now trying to resolve. In the only such 
case to come before a court, a California judge 
determined that a surrogate mother who gestated 
and gave birth to a child created from another 
couple's sperm and egg, pursuant to a surrogacy 
agreement, had no legal rights to the child. Instead, 
the judge recognized the ovum and sperm donors as 
the sole legal parents of the child. 
I will argue that as a matter of ethics and good 
public policy that focuses on the institution of the 
family, the California court decided the case incor-
rectly. I will argue that if we look at the problem from 
the perspective of citizens and scholars rather than 
scientists, lawyers, and judges, the woman who ges-
tates a child must be recognized as a parent of that 
child. But first let's look at how the law has reckoned 
with assisted reproduction in the past. 
THELEGALRESPONSETO 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
Before we assume that there is no conceptual frame-
work in law for dealing with issues associated with 
the new assisted-reproduction technologies, we 
should remember that humans have been trying to 
overcome problems of infertility for a long time. 
Adoption is one legal solution. Of course, the diffi-
culties of adoption make it a less-than-attractive 
option for many infertile couples. And it is not a 
solution for couples who long to have a child who is 
genetically related to them. 
Artificial insemination was the first "technol-
ogy" available to help some of these couples. Artifi-
cial insemination by donor uses sperm from a third 
party (most often an anonymous donor). The pro-
cess is necessary if the husband is unable to produce 
potent sperm and may also be used if the husband 
has a genetic trait that the couple does not want to 
pass on to their offspring. Its use also created new 
legal questions about genetic relatedness and paren-
tal responsibility. The method was used-signifi-
cantly, in my opinion-without explicit legislation 
authorizing such a practice. But like most couples 
who have children, the couples probably assured 
themselves that nothing would ever happen that 
would make them or anyone else question the ge-
netic origins of their children. 
However, some of those marriages ended in 
divorce. During several of the divorce proceedings, 
husbands raised the issue of the lack of genetic 
connection of the child in attempts to defeat child 
support obligations. When courts were faced with 
those attempts by fathers to claim in effect that 
genetic connection was the only means of defining 
parental obligations, they managed to come up with , 
a variety of legal theories to enforce the support ' 
obligations upon the fathers. After a string of such 
cases most states, including New York, passed legis-
lation to settle the matter. A New York domestic 
relations law finally passed in 1974 provides: 
§73 Legitimacy of Child Born by Artificial 
Insemination 
( 1) Any child born to a married woman by 
means of artificial insemination performed 
by persons duly authorized to practice medi-
cine and with the consent in writing of the 
woman and her husband, shall be deemed 
the legitimate, natural child of the hus-
band and his wife for all purposes. 
(2) The aforesaid written consent shall be ex-
ecuted and acknowledged by both the hus-
band and wife, and the physician who 
performs the technique shall certify that 
he had rendered the service. 
There is an ethical argument about the nature 
of familial obligations embedded in the statute. It is 
important to make the argument explicit before 
turning to the practice of in vitro fertilization. In any 
disputes that might arise as the result of the use of 
reproductive technology, the goal of the law is to 
protect the interests of the child in having at least 
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one, but preferably two, parents who are responsible 
for it. The law centers on the obUgatiO'IlS of the adults 
rather than on their rights. In fact, the definition of a 
child, from the perspective of the law, is simply a 
human being, under a certain legally prescribed age, 
whose economic, social, and general well-being are 
the responsibility of some adult or adults. Thus in 
law the primary question is: Who are the adults who 
are obligated to act as parents to this particular child? 
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is so named because the 
fertilization actually takes place in vitro (literally, 
"in the glass"), usually in a laboratory test tube or 
petri dish. The egg, or ovum, is extracted from a 
woman's ovary via a surgical technique. The egg and 
sperm are then combined in vitro. In the event of 
successful fertilization, the embryo is implanted into 
a woman's uterus, with the hope that pregnancy will 
result. 
The simplest IVF scenario occurs when a 
woman's egg is extracted, fertilized with her husband's 
sperm, and implanted in her own body. The process 
requires no donor material and may be helpful for 
some infertile couples. For other couples IVF with 
their own genetic material is impossible, and the 
sperm or the egg, or both, must originate from a 
third-party donor. Donor gametes-genetic mate-
rial (sperm or eggs) before fertilization-may also be 
used for IVF if one or both spouses have a genetic 
disease that they do not want to pass on to the next 
generation. A third possibility is that a couple may 
acquire a donated embryo, which is implanted in the 
woman who intends to give birth to and raise the 
child. 
My ideas about appropriate legal responses to 
those techniques have evolved in conjunction with 
my work as the chair of the New York State Bar 
Association's Special Committee on Biotechnology 
and the Law. When faced with the problem of what 
laws, if any, should be recommended regarding in 
vitro fertilization, afrer much debate the committee 
concluded that the approach taken to artificial in-
semination ought to be used to address in vitro 
fertilization. The conclusion was based on the belief 
that regardless of the type of assisted reproduction, 
the children born should be provided the same legal 
protections. We created that protection by recom-
mending that the statute on artificial insemination 
be modified to include in vitro fertilization. The 
statute would then read as follows: 
§73 Legitimacy of Child Born by Artificial 
Insemination or In Vitro FertiUzation 
( 1) Any child born to a married woman by 
means of artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization [new language in italics] per-
formed by persons duly authorized to prac-
tice medicine and with the consent in 
writing of the woman and her husband, 
shall be deemed the legitimate, natural 
child of the husband and his wife for all 
purposes. 
( 2) The aforesaid written consent shall be ex-
ecuted and acknowledged by both the hus-
band and wife, and the physician who 
performs the technique shall certify that 
he had rendered the service. 
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That legislation could provide some protection 
for children born from the use of reproductive tech-
nologies and give fair warning, assuming conscien-
tious lawyers, of the legal risks that couples and 
individual gamete donors might be taking if they 
operate outside the legal framework. 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND 
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
The proposed in vitro legislation takes into account 
the separation of genetic and gestational maternity, 
as in the case of egg donation. But when making its 
recommendation, the committee had not contem-
plated the full impact of gestational surrogate moth-
erhood. Upon reflection, we realized that most of 
the time the law had been concerned with establish-
ing male parentage because female parentage was so 
clearly established either by giving birth or adopting 
the child. We therefore had to go back and look 
clearly at the question of who are parents. Thus we 
realized that the artificial insemination model was 
inadequate for some cases of bifurcated maternity, 
which the practices of egg donation, embryo trans-
fer, in vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy 
make possible. 
Specifically, if a woman is unable to gestate a 
child, a couple may seek a physician who will create 
an embryo from their gametes and then enlist the 
aid of another woman, a "gestational surrogate," to 
gestate and give birth to the child. This is what 
occurred in the California case. Crispina Calvert 
was unable to bear children. She and her husband, 
Mark, sought out Anna Johnson, who agreed to 
serve as a surrogate. Johnson agreed in writing to 
give the child over to them for formal adoption, and 
the Calverts agreed in writing to pay Johnson's 
medical expenses plus $10,000 after she did so. 
Unfortunately, as in some agreements, things 
did not tum out as the parties expected. Before the 
birth of the child, during her seventh month of 
pregnancy, Anna Johnson indicated that she was 
not sure she wanted to give up the child. The Cal verts 
filed suit asking the court to decide who were the 
rightful parents. As the case has now progressed 
through a trial and one appeal, the California courts 
have twice decided that Anna Johnson, the woman 
who gave birth to the child, is not the legal mother 
of the child. 
In essence, the court has decided that the ge-
netic connectedness is legally more significant than 
the biological process of gestation. However, the 
decision ignores the well-established family law con-
cept that gestation and birth are the determinants of 
legal maternal status. 
In this case, with two women contesting who 
should be the child's legal mother, the court deter-
mined that Crispina Calvert, the gamete donor, was 
the mother, and that Anna Johnson had no legal 
rights to custody or visitation of the child she ges-
tated and gave birth to. 
The California appellate court seemed to as-
sume that the female and male biological contribu-
tions to the birth of a child are equivalent and thus 
that the same standards used to determine paternity 
may be used to determine maternity. A blood test 
showed that Crispina Calvert was genetically re-
lated to the child. And the court used that evidence 
to then determine that she was the mother. But 
neither party had disputed that Mrs. Calvert's ga-
metes were used to form the embryo Johnson ges-
tated. There was no dispute of the facts in the case, 
simply a question of the legal significance of those 
facts. And in failing to name Johnson as the legal 
mother, the appellate court in its reasoning refused 
to give legal significance to a biological difference 
between men and women-the ability of women to 
give birth. 
I believe that a woman who gestates a child 
must be seen as a legal parent if the law is to give 
effect to the social ideal of fairness and equality 
between the genders. Current laws recognize that 
men and women are different in their contribution 
to reproduction. While both men and women are 
equal in terms of the genetic contributions, only 
women can get pregnant and give birth. For law to 
treat men and women equally, it must recognize the 
significance of that unique contribution. Indeed, 
the difference in reproductive roles is already recog-
nized in the constitutional right of a woman to have 
sole decision-making authority to terminate her preg-
nancy, whether she is married or not. 
Pregnancy also creates a unique connection 
between a woman and her fetus. We have recog-
nized that connection as the basis of the intimate 
bond between the woman and her newborn. And 
before the advent of reproductive technologies, we 
Current 
laws recognize 
that men and 
women are 
different in their 
contribution to 
reproduction. 
always assumed that the woman who gestated a 
child was the legal mother. In a sense, the determi-
nation of maternity has been established in the acts 
of gestation and birth. For instance, for the purposes 
of registering a child's birth, the present law and 
practice is to ask the woman who gives birth who the 
father is. We have thus assumed and in fact struc-
tured most of our laws regarding obligations to sup-
port children on the premise that a woman who 
gestates is the mother .1 
Technologies such as in vitro fertilization, egg 
donation, and embryo transfer now allow us to con-
template separating the act of gestation from legal 
maternal status. The difficult question now is whether 
we should maintain the connection between gesta-
tion and legal motherhood and adapt our laws to 
accommodate the use of the new reproductive tech-
nologies. My answer is yes, but the law should be 
changed in small increments to leave room for sci-
entists, lawyers, and physicians to grapple with a 
host of ethical questions to which the technologies 
give rise. 
Of course, the legislation that I would recom-
mend does not answer all the ethical questions cre-
ated by new reproductive technologies. In fact, I 
propose only to confirm the legal significance of 
gestation, even if doing so would yield a rather messy 
result in the Johnson-Calvert case. I believe that the 
child in that gestational surrogacy arrangement now 
has three legal parents: the Calverts, who donated 
the gametes, and Anna Johnson, who bore the child. 
A court should consider which parent or parents 
should get custody based on what is best for the 
child. 
Following that reasoning, the bar association 
committee reached the conclusion that further 
amendments to §73 are necessary. 
§ 73 Parents of Child Born by Artificial Insemi-
nation or In Vitro Fertilization 
( 1) Any child born to a woman by means of 
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization 
shall be deemed the child of that woman. 
(2) Arly child born to a married woman by 
means of artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization performed by persons duly au-
thorized to practice medicine and with the 
consent in writing of the woman and her 
husband, shall be deemed the legitimate, 
natural child of the husband and his wife 
for all purposes. 
(3) The aforesaid written consent shall be ex-
ecuted and acknowledged by both the hus-
band and wife, and the physician who 
performs the technique shall certify that 
he had rendered the service.2 
The original statute implicitly takes into ac-
count the possible separation of genetic and social 
paternity. It recognizes the social union of marriage 
and the man's relation to the woman who gives birth 
as the legal determinant of paternity. The proposed 
amendment, which includes a child born as a result 
of in vitro fertilization, also allows for the separation 
of genetic and gestational maternity. The proposed 
amendment further recognizes that, regardless of the 
source of the genetic material, a woman who gives 
birth to a child via artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization is the mother of that child. Thus in a 
case of gestational surrogacy, in order for the gamete 
donors, usually husband and wife, to achieve their 
objective of raising their genetic progeny as their 
own child, the gestational woman's status as a legal 
parent would have to be extinguished through some 
legal process such as adoption. 
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In sum, the recommended statute does not out-
law or prohibit surrogacy but does clarify who has 
maternal status in the same way that the existing 
statute clarifies paternal status in the case of artificial 
insemination. The proposed statute is designed as 
the starting point for resolving conflicts about ma-
ternity. The modifications would make clear that 
regardless of the source of the gametes, a child born 
to a particular woman is, in the eyes of the law, the 
child of that woman. The modification would cover 
the majority of cases, in which genetic and gesta-
tional maternity are not separated, as well as the less 
common situations of bifurcated maternity (gesta-
tional surrogacy or situations in which the woman 
who is the intended parent gestates a donated egg or 
embryo). 
The proposed statute could lead to a disturbing 
result in a dispute between a woman who has ges-
tated a child and a man and woman who provided 
the gametes for the embryo with the intention of 
raising the child as their own. Without any further 
legislation a judge could find that the child has three 
parents, each of whom would be entitled to be heard 
as to questions of custody and visitation. The gestat-
ing woman would be the mother of the child by 
operation of the statute. Upon giving birth, she 
would immediately have custody of the child. The 
sperm donor would be the father, because law recog-
nizes genetic contribution for determining male pa-
rental status. And, for equity concerns, the female 
gamete donor would be given equal status in law to 
the male gamete donor. So the gamete donors are 
also parents and would be entitled to be heard as to 
the child's custody. Although under existing law the 
gestating woman is presumed to be entitled to cus-
tody, both gamete donors would thus be entitled to 
contest that custody or seek visitation rights. 
To avoid such contests, the legislature could 
pass a law to facilitate surrogacy agreements. Such a 
law might include explicit provisions for judicial 
supervision of the parties. New Hampshire recently 
enacted legislation that creates just such a system of 
judicial oversight.3 TheN ew Hampshire law permits 
arrangements in which the surrogate is artificially 
inseminated with the sperm of the intended father 
and also gestational surrogacy arrangements. 
The New Hampshire surrogate agreement must 
be judicially preauthorized in a county probate court. 
Under it, the surrogate mother can choose to exer-
cise her right to keep the child at any time before 
seventy-two hours after birth, in which case, paren-
tal rights vest solely in her (and her husband). Oth-
erwise the parental rights of the surrogate (and her 
husband) terminate seventy-two hours after birth. 
So even inside a regulatory scheme to facilitate 
surrogate arrangements, gestation still creates an 
exclusive claim on legal maternity for the surrogate 
if she chooses to keep the child. 
Another option is to suggest that the legislature 
pass a law to prohibit surrogacy altogether. Under 
such a law, surrogate contracts would not be en-
forceable in court.4 I favor the option, because I 
believe that the evidence is now clear that doctors 
and lawyers involved in surrogacy arrangements will 
continue to encourage couples who desperately want 
genetically related children to push the ethical fron-
tiers in ways that could undermine our sense of 
obligation to children. 
Supporting a statute that would prevent the 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements does not re-
quire supporting criminal sanctions against those 
who engage in surrogacy practices. Some people will 
seek to use such agreements, just as they used artifi-
cial insemination before legal safeguards were in 
place, because it was available and because they had 
a strong desire for genetically related offspring. The 
wish to be responsible for the next generation is not 
something that society should discourage, yet we 
must create some constraints by advising the parties 
of the risks, including the legal ones, if they choose 
to employ a surrogate. Under my recommendation, 
by operation of the statute, married couples would 
have no legal risks to custody of their children through 
their use of in vitro fertilization or artificial insemi-
nation. However, when a couple seeks to use an-
otherwoman's reproductive capacity (as a surrogate), 
my legislative solution requires that the parties bear 
the consequence of judicial uncertainty as to the 
child's custody without explicit legislative standards. 
Scientists, physicians, and lawyers should consider 
that uncertainty as they develop or advocate the use 
of reproductive technologies. 
Larry I. Palmer is a 
professor of law at the 
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vice president for 
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CONCLUSION 
My general conclusion about the new reproductive 
technologies is that we should get away from the 
rights-based approach that I believe has its origins in 
the abortion debate in this country. As I have tried 
to demonstrate, an institutionalist approach focuses 
on the social implications of the technologies and 
recognizes that the aim is to keep the family secure as 
an important social institution, while allowing in-
fertile couples access to those technologies. 
If we adopt the institutionalist framework, we 
must recognize that family is a private, not a public, 
institution, and thus the role of law is limited and 
indeterminate. When thinking about the family as 
an institution, the primary function of the law is to 
delineate the adults' obligations toward children, 
not their rights to them. I would remind you that the 
legal and ethical problems with in vitro fertilization 
and the practice of surrogacy are not new. The 
legislative response to the use of artificial insemina-
tion is based on a concept of family and obligations 
to children. And I believe that that is the proper 
foundation for a legislative response to the newer 
technologies. 
As suggested, law should base legal maternal 
status on the act of childbearing. To do otherwise 
would be to ignore the unique role that a woman 
plays in nurturing a new life. And to eliminate the 
presumption that a child born to a woman is that 
woman's child would demand that the law inquire 
into issues that I believe should remain private. 
Again, that is not to say that a woman could not 
choose to follow through on a private agreement to 
relinquish her maternal status after the child's birth 
and allow another woman to become the legal mother 
of the child. All I suggest is that it is improper for law 
to force her to do so by making enforceable a surrogacy 
agreement. 
Finally, because law is protecting a private in-
stitution, it cannot and should not resolve all the 
ethical issues that the new reproductive technolo-
gies create. Many of the concerns can only be re-
solved by individuals with reference to their own 
religious or personal values about human life. Rather, 
law should make accommodations to the new repro-
ductive technologies in small increments. The ethi-
cal debate must continue, for we are sure to have 
newer and bolder technologies within reach soon. I 
believe that we need to address the advances not just 
with reference to the rights of individuals. More 
importantly, we must contemplate the impact of the 
technologies on the creation of families and on how 
adults accept responsibility for the creation and care 
of the next generation. 
1. Of course, the status of motherhood can be transferred 
after birth. Adoption is the clear example of that transfer: 
the woman who gives birth is the mother, but she can 
relinquish her legal maternal status to allow another 
woman to adopt the child and so become its legal mother. 
2. The bar association's Special Committee on Biotech-
nology and the Law is still deliberating on this modifica-
tion of the statute. 
3. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §168-B:1 to B:32 (1990). 
4. New Yorkrecentlypassedalaw,effectiveJuly 17,1993, 
to prohibit surrogacy. NewYork Domestic Relations Law 
§§ 121-24 makes surrogate-parenting contracts void and 
unenforceable. But the statute does not make clear what 
standing the female gamete donor might have in a failed 
(unenforceable) surrogate agreement by virtue of her 
genetic relation to the child. 
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